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ABSTRACT: What sort of entities are electrons, photons and atoms given their wave-like and particle-like properties? 
Is nature fundamentally deterministic or probabilistic? Orthodox quantum theory (OQT) evades answering 
these two basic questions by being a theory about the results of performing measurements on quantum sys-
tems. But this evasion results in OQT being a seriously defective theory. A rival, somewhat ignored strategy 
is to conjecture that the quantum domain is fundamentally probabilistic. This means quantum entities, in-
teracting with one another probabilistically, must differ radically from the entities of deterministic classical 
physics, the classical wave or particle. It becomes possible to conceive of quantum entities as a new kind of 
fundamentally probabilistic entity, the “propensiton”, neither wave nor particle. A fully micro realistic, test-
able rival to OQT results. 
Keywords: philosophy of science, quantum theory, realism, probabilism, wave/particle dilemma, propensities, meas-
urement.  
 
1. Orthodox quantum theory is the best and worst of theories 
What sort of entities are electrons, photons and atoms given their wave-like and parti-
cle-like properties? Is nature fundamentally deterministic or probabilistic? Any decent 
theory of the quantum domain, able to provide us with genuine knowledge and under-
standing of its nature, ought to provide answers to these childishly elementary ques-
tions. Orthodox quantum theory (OQT) evades answering these questions by being a 
theory, not about quantum systems as such, but rather about the results of performing 
measurements on such systems.1  
  This state of affairs came about as follows. Bohr, Heisenberg, Dirac and the other 
creators of OQT did not know how to solve the quantum wave/particle dilemma. 
This created a grave problem for those seeking to develop quantum theory. How can 
one develop a consistent theory about entities that seem to be both wave-like and par-
ticle-like, as in the two slit experiment for example? Heisenberg around 1925 hit upon 
the strategy of evading this fundamental dilemma by developing what subsequently 
became matrix mechanics as a theory exclusively about the results of performing mea-
surements on quantum systems, this version of quantum theory thus not needing to 
specify the nature of quantum systems when not undergoing measurement. Schrödin-
ger, a little later in 1926, developed wave mechanics in the hope that it would be a 
precise theory about the nature of quantum systems. This theory, Schrödinger hoped, 
would show the electron to be wave-like in character. But then Born successfully in-
terpreted the Ψ function of Schrödinger’s wave mechanics as specifying the 
probability of detecting the particle in question. According to Born’s crucial interpre-
                                                      
1 Good introductory accounts of OQT, increasingly technical, are Squires (1986); Gillespie (1973); Feyn-
man et al (1965). See also Maxwell (1998, appendix). 
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tative postulate, |Ψ|2.dV gives the probability of detecting the particle in volume 
element dV if a position measurement is performed. Schrödinger proved that his the-
ory and Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics are equivalent: the outcome, a sort of synthe-
sis of the two theories, is OQT. 
  OQT is an extraordinarily successful theory empirically, perhaps the most success-
ful in the whole of physics when one takes into account the range, immense diversity, 
and accuracy of its predictions. But not only does it fail to solve the great quantum 
mystery of what sort of entities electrons and atoms can be in view of their apparently 
contradictory particle and wave properties. It also fails to answer the other childishly 
elementary question: Is the quantum domain deterministic or probabilistic? The basic 
dynamic equation of OQT, Schrödinger’s time-dependent equation, is deterministic in 
character. It tells us that quantum states, given by Ψ, evolve deterministically in time, 
as long as no measurements are made. But this does not mean OQT asserts that the 
quantum domain is deterministic. First, given OQT, Ψ cannot be interpreted as speci-
fying the actual physical state of a quantum system, just because OQT fails to solve 
the wave/particle dilemma, and thus fails to provide a consistent specification of the 
physical nature of quantum systems when not being measured. Given OQT, Ψ must 
be interpreted as containing no more than information about the outcome of per-
forming measurements. Secondly, OQT in general makes probabilistic predictions about 
the outcome of performing measurements, not (apart from exceptional circumstances) 
deterministic predictions. But one cannot conclude from this that OQT asserts that the 
quantum domain is fundamentally probabilistic in character, some physical states of af-
fairs only determining what occurs subsequently only probabilistically. This is because, 
according to OQT, probabilistic outcomes only occur when we intervene, and make a 
measurement. In the absence of measurement, nothing probabilistic occurs at all, ac-
cording to OQT. Indeed, if the process of measurement is treated quantum mechani-
cally, then nothing probabilistic occurs at all, precisely because the basic dynamic equation of 
OQT, Schrödinger’s time-dependent equation, is deterministic. 
  The inability of OQT to answer these two elementary questions is in itself a seri-
ous failure of the theory. But there are, as a consequence, a host of further failures and 
defects. Because OQT is about the results of performing measurements on quantum 
systems (and not about quantum systems per se, due to its failure to solve the 
wave/particle problem), in order to come up with physical predictions OQT must 
consist of two parts, (1) quantum postulates, and (2) some part of classical physics for 
a treatment of measurement. (2) is indispensable. (1) alone, precisely because OQT 
lacks its own quantum ontology, cannot predict anything physical at all —or at least 
can only make conditional predictions of the form: if such and such a measurement is 
made, such and such will be the outcome with such and such a probability. Thus 
OQT = QP + CP, where “QP” stands for the quantum mechanical postulates of the 
theory, and “CP” stands for the classical postulates, required for measurement. 
  In what follows, a quantum “measurement” is a process that actually detects quan-
tum systems; a process which prepares a quantum system to be in a certain quantum 
state, but does not detect the system, is a “preparation” rather than a “measurement”. 
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  OQT, construed as QP + CP, as it must be, is a seriously defective theory. (a) 
OQT is imprecise, due to the inherent lack of precision of the notion of “measure-
ment”. How complex and macroscopic must a process be before it becomes a meas-
urement? Does the dissociation of one molecule amount to a measurement? Or must 
a thousand or a million molecules be dissociated before a measurement has been 
made? Or must a human being observe the result? No precise answer is forthcoming. 
(b) OQT is ambiguous, in that if the measuring process is treated as a measurement, 
the outcome is in general probabilistic, but if this process is treated quantum mechani-
cally, the outcome is deterministic. (c) OQT is very seriously ad hoc, in that it consists 
of two incompatible, conceptually clashing parts, QP and CP. OQT only avoids being 
a straightforward contradiction by specifying, in an arbitrary, ad hoc way, that QP ap-
plies to the quantum system up to the moment of measurement, and CP applies to the 
final measurement result. (d) OQT is non-explanatory, in part because it is ad hoc, and 
no ad hoc theory is fully explanatory, in part because OQT must presuppose some part 
of what it should explain, namely classical physics. OQT cannot fully explain how 
classical phenomena emerge from quantum phenomena because some part of classical 
physics must be presupposed for measurement. (e) OQT is limited in scope in that it 
cannot, strictly speaking, be applied to the early universe in conditions which lacked 
preparation and measurement devices. Strictly speaking, indeed, it can only be applied 
if physicists are around to make measurements. (f) OQT is limited in scope in that it 
cannot be applied to the cosmos as a whole, since this would require preparation and 
measurement devices that are outside the cosmos, which is difficult to arrange. Quan-
tum cosmology, employing OQT, is not possible. (g) For somewhat similar reasons, 
OQT is such that it resists unification with general relativity. Such a unification would 
presumably involve attributing some kind of quantum state to spacetime itself (general 
relativity being a theory of spacetime). But, granted the basic structure of OQT, this 
would require that preparation and measurement devices exist outside spacetime, 
again not easy to arrange. 
  These nine defects, the two basic failures with which we began and the seven con-
sequential defects, (a) to (g), are, taken together, very serious indeed. Despite its im-
mense empirical success, OQT must be declared to be an unacceptably defective the-
ory. It is the best of theories, and the worst of theories.2
  In opposition to this conclusion, it may be argued that all physical theories, even a 
classical theory such as Newtonian theory (NT), must call upon additional theory to 
be tested empirically. In testing predictions of NT concerning the position of a planet 
at such and such a time, optical theory is required to predict the results of telescopic 
observations made here on earth. But this objection misses the point. NT is perfectly 
capable of issuing in physical predictions without calling upon additional theory, just 
because it has its own physical ontology. NT, plus initial and boundary conditions 
                                                      
2 Rival interpretations of quantum theory include: Bohm’s interpretation, according to which quantum 
systems are both particles and waves; Everett’s many-worlds interpretation; decoherence; consistent 
histories. None of these, in my view, provides us with a satisfactory version of quantum theory. For 
critical surveys and further literature see Squires (1986); Rae (2002, ch. 13); Bacciagaluppi (2003).  
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formulated in terms of the theory, can issue in the physical prediction that such and 
such a planet is at such and such a place at such and such a time, whether anyone ob-
serves the planet or not, without calling upon optical theory or any other theory. This 
OQT cannot do. It cannot do this because it lacks its own quantum ontology, having 
failed to solve the quantum wave/particle problem. In order to deliver an uncondi-
tional physical prediction, OQT must call upon some part of classical physics, as a 
matter of necessity, so that the theory can refer to something physically actual. The 
case of NT and OQT are quite different, because NT postulates actually existing 
physical bodies whether observed or not, whereas QP does not; for that one requires 
OQT, that is QP + CP. 
  It may be objected that even if non-relativistic quantum theory fails to solve the 
wave/particle problem, relativistic quantum theory, or quantum field theory, does 
solve the problem in that it declares that what exists is the quantum field, “particles” 
being discrete excitations of the field. But this objection misses the point as well. Or-
thodox quantum field theory (OQFT) is just as dependent on measurement, and thus 
on some part of classical physics, as non-relativistic OQT is. The quantum states of 
the quantum field of OQFT have to be interpreted as making probabilistic predictions 
about the results of performing measurements, just as in the case of OQT. A version 
of quantum field theory which succeeded in specifying the nature of the quantum field 
in a fully satisfactory way, so that the theory has its own quantum ontology entirely 
independent of any part of classical physics, would be able to issue in physical predic-
tions about actual physical states of affairs entirely independently of measurement. 
Such a theory would be able to predict and explain macroscopic, quasi-classical phe-
nomena as arising from the quantum field alone, without calling upon some part of 
classical physics for a treatment of measurement. This OQFT cannot do. 
2. Probabilism to the rescue 
What needs to be done to cure OQT of its serious defects? The primary task must be 
to specify precisely and unambiguously the nature of quantum entities so that quan-
tum theory (QT) can be formulated as a testable theory about how these entities evol-
ve and interact without there being any mention of measurement or observables in the 
postulates of the theory at all. The key point that needs to be appreciated, I suggest, in 
order successfully to complete this task, is that the quantum domain is fundamentally 
probabilistic.3 It is this that the manifestly probabilistic character of QT is trying to tell 
us. 
  The approach to solving the mysteries of the quantum domain that I am suggest-
ing here has been long ignored largely because of the accidents of history. When 
Quantum Theory (QT) was being developed and interpreted, during the first three 
                                                      
3 Popper has suggested that probabilism is the key to understanding wave/particle duality, and has put 
forward a propensity interpretation of quantum theory: see Popper (1957, 1967, 1982). His interpre-
tation of quantum theory is, however, unsatisfactory and quite different from the one I advocate 
here. For my criticisms of Popper see Maxwell (1976, 285-6; 1985, 41-2).  
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decades of the last century, two opposing camps developed: the Bohr-Heisenberg 
camp, which argued for the abandonment of micro-realism, and the abandonment of 
determinism; and the Einstein-Schrödinger camp, which argued for the retention of 
realism, and the retention of determinism. One result of this polarization of views was 
that the idea of retaining realism but abandoning probabilism got overlooked. But it is 
just this overlooked option, I maintain, which gives us our best hope of curing the de-
fects of QT. One might call this option probabilistic micro-realism. 
  Once we acknowledge that the quantum domain is fundamentally probabilistic, so 
that the basic laws governing the way quantum systems interact with one another are 
probabilistic, it is clear that measurement cannot be a satisfactory necessary and suffi-
cient condition for probabilistic transitions to occur. Probabilistic transitions must be 
occurring in nature whether or not physicists are around to dub certain processes 
“measurements”. The very notion of measurement is in any case, as we have seen, in-
herently imprecise. We require a new, precise, necessary and sufficient condition for 
probabilistic transitions to occur, to be specified in fundamental, quantum mechanical 
terms. 
  Furthermore, once the fundamentally probabilistic character of the quantum do-
main is acknowledged, it immediately becomes clear how the key quantum 
wave/particle problem is to be solved. If the quantum domain is fundamentally prob-
abilistic, then the physical entities of this domain, electrons, atoms and the rest, cannot 
possibly be classical, deterministic entities —classical particles, waves or fields. Quite 
generally, we should hold that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the dy-
namical laws of a physical theory on the one hand, and the entities and their physical 
properties postulated by the theory, on the other hand. In speaking of the entities, and 
the properties of entities, postulated by a physical theory, we are thereby speaking, in 
other terms, of the dynamical laws of the theory. Hence, change dynamical laws in 
some basic way, and we thereby change postulated physical entities and their proper-
ties. In particular, change dynamical laws dramatically, so that they become probabilis-
tic instead of being deterministic, and the nature of postulated physical entities must 
change dramatically as well. Quantum entities, interacting with one another probabilis-
tically, must be quite different from all physical entities so far encountered within de-
terministic classical physics. 
  [Elsewhere (Maxwell, 1976, 283-6; 1988, 44-8) I have indicated how the notion of 
probabilistic physical property, or propensity, that is being presupposed here, amounts 
to a probabilistic generalization of the notion of deterministic, necessitating property 
explicated in Maxwell (1968); see also Maxwell (1998, 141-55). I might add, no doubt 
controversially, that in my view my 1968 paper gives the definitive account of how 
dispositional, necessitating properties in physics should be conceived. This viewpoint, 
in particular, makes no appeal to Kripke’s (1981) fallacious considerations concerning 
identity and necessity: for a refutation of Kripke, see Maxwell (2001, appendix 2). 
Much subsequent work on dispositional properties in science is vitiated by a failure to 
take my earlier work into account, and a reliance instead on Kripke.]  
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  The defects of OQT have arisen, in other words, because physicists have sought to 
interpret probabilistic quantum theory in terms of classical waves and particles, deter-
ministic metaphysical ideas appropriate to earlier classical physics but wholly inappro-
priate to the new quantum theory. The failure of this entirely misguided attempt then 
led to despair at the possibility of solving the (misconstrued) wave/particle problem, 
despair at the possibility of specifying the precise physical nature of quantum entities. 
This despair in turn led to the development of OQT as a theory about the results of 
performing measurements —a theory which, it seemed, did not need to specify the 
precise nature of quantum entities. But the outcome is a theory burdened with the ni-
ne serious defects indicated above. 
  Thus the traditional quantum wave/particle problem is the wrong problem to pose. 
We should ask, not “Are quantum entities waves or particles?”, but rather (1) What 
kinds of possible, unproblematic, fundamentally probabilistic physical entities are 
there?, and (2) Are quantum entities one kind of such unproblematic probabilistic en-
tity? 
  The failure to put right the serious defects of OQT has persisted for so long be-
cause physicists have abandoned hope of solving the traditional quantum 
wave/particle problem, not realizing that this is entirely the wrong problem to try to 
solve in the first place. Once it is appreciated that (1) and (2) are the right problems to 
try to solve, new possibilities, long overlooked, immediately spring to mind. 
  First, physical entities that interact with one another probabilistically may be 
dubbed propensitons. Two kinds of unproblematic propensiton can immediately be dis-
tinguished: continuous propensitons, which evolve probabilistically continuously in time, 
and  intermittent  propensitons, which evolve deterministically except for intermittent 
moments in time when appropriate physical conditions arise, and the propensitons 
undergo probabilistic transitions. 
  There is a second obvious distinction that can be made between propensitons 
which spread out spatially in time, increasing the volume of space they occupy with 
the passage of time, and propensitons which do not spread spatially in this way. Let us 
call the first spatially spreading propensitons, and the second spatially confined propensi-
tons. 
  We are in new territory. In our ordinary experience of the world, and within de-
terministic physics, we never encounter propensitons. Probabilistic outcomes, ob-
tained when we toss a penny or a die, can always be put down to probabilistic changes 
in initial conditions. Classical statistical mechanics presupposes that the underlying 
dynamic laws are deterministic. Having no experience of them, propensitons will, in-
evitably, when we first encounter them, strike us as mysterious, even unacceptably 
weird. But these feelings of unfamiliarity ought not to lead us into deciding that theo-
ries which postulate such entities are inherently unacceptable. In particular, the four 
kinds of propensity indicated above should be regarded as equally viable, a priori. 
Whether a theory that postulates one or other type of propensiton is acceptable or not 
should be decided upon in the usual way, in terms of its empirical success, and the ex-
tent to which it is unified, simple, explanatory. 
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  Granted that quantum systems are some kind of propensiton, which of the four 
kinds of unproblematic propensiton just indicated should we take quantum systems to 
be? There is here a very important consideration to be borne in mind. Despite suffer-
ing from the nine defects indicated above, nevertheless OQT is perhaps the most em-
pirically successful physical theory ever formulated. The range, variety and accuracy of 
its empirical predictions are unprecedented. No other physical theory has been sub-
jected to such sustained severe experimental testing, and has survived without a single 
refutation. There are good grounds for holding that OQT has got quite a lot right 
about the nature of the quantum world. Our strategy, then, ought to be, in the first in-
stance at least, to stick as close to OQT as possible, and modify OQT just sufficiently 
to remove the defects of the theory. The structure of OQT mirrors that of the inter-
mittent, spatially spreading propensiton. On the one hand quantum states evolve de-
terministically, in accordance with Schrödinger’s time-dependent equation; on the 
other hand, there are, on the face of it, probabilistic transitions associated with meas-
urement. Quantum states spread out spatially when evolving deterministically, and 
tend to become localized when measurements are made. All this mirrors the character 
of the intermittent, spatially spreading propensiton, the only unsatisfactory feature of 
OQT being that the theory stipulates that probabilistic transitions occur when 
measurements are made. 
  A very elementary kind of spatially spreading intermittent propensiton is the fol-
lowing. It consists of a sphere, which expands at a steady rate (deterministic evolution) 
until it touches a second sphere, at which moment the sphere becomes instantane-
ously a minute sphere, of definite radius, somewhere within the space occupied by the 
large sphere, probabilistically determined. The second sphere undergoes the same in-
stantaneous probabilistic transition. Then both minute spheres again undergo steady, 
deterministic expansion, until they touch once more, and another probabilistic local-
ization occurs. 
  A slightly more sophisticated version of this elementary spatially spreading inter-
mittent propensiton is the following. The sphere is made up of variable “position 
probability density”, such that, when the sphere localizes probabilistically, in the way 
just indicated, it is most probable that it will be localized where the position probabil-
ity density is most dense. A law specifies how position probability density is distrib-
uted throughout the sphere. We might even imagine that the position probability den-
sity exhibits a wave-like distribution. Such a propensiton, given appropriate conditions 
for probabilistic localization, might even exhibit interference phenomena in a two-slit 
experiment! 
  Quantum entities, such as electrons, photons and atoms, are, I suggest, spatially 
spreading intermittent propensitons. Their physical state is specified by the Ψ func-
tion of QT. The deterministic evolution of these quantum propensitons is specified by 
Schrödinger’s time-dependent equation: 
ih ∂Φ(t)     =     _  h2  ∇2 Φ(t)   +   V Φ(t). 
      ∂t                    2m                                                       
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  The crucial questions that need to be answered to specify precisely the probabilis-
tic properties —or propensities— of quantum systems are these: 
(a)  What is the precise quantum mechanical condition for a probabilistic tran-
sition to occur? 
(b)  Given the quantum state, Ψ, at the instant before the probabilistic transi-
tion, how does this determine what the possible outcome states are, φ1, φ2, 
. . . φN? 
(c) How  does  Ψ determine the probability pr that the outcome of the prob-
abilistic transition will be φr, for r = 1, 2, . . . N? 
(d)  How can (a) to (c) be answered so that the resulting fundamentally prob-
abilistic version of quantum theory reproduces all the empirical success of 
OQT? 
  A number of different answers can be given to (a) to (d).  
  One possibility is the proposal of Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber (see Ghirardi and 
Rimini, 1990) according to which the quantum state of a system such as an electron 
collapses spontaneously, on average after the passage of millions of years, into a highly 
localized state. When a measurement is performed on the quantum system, it becomes 
quantum entangled with millions upon millions of quantum systems that go to make 
up the measuring apparatus. In a very short time there is a high probability that one of 
these quantum systems will spontaneously collapse, causing all the other quantum en-
tangled systems, including the electron, to collapse as well. At the micro level, it is al-
most impossible to detect collapse, but at the macro level, associated with measure-
ment, collapse occurs very rapidly all the time. 
  Another possibility is the proposal of Penrose (1986), according to which collapse 
occurs when the state of a system evolves into a superposition of two or more states, 
each state having, associated with it, a sufficiently large mass located at a distinct re-
gion of space. The idea is that general relativity imposes a restriction on the extent to 
which such superpositions can develop, in that it does not permit such superpositions 
to evolve to such an extent that each state of the superposition has a substantially dis-
tinct space-time curvature associated with it. 
  The possibility that I favour, put forward before either Ghirardi, Rimini and We-
ber’s proposal, or Penrose’s proposal, is that probabilistic transitions occur whenever, 
as a result of inelastic interactions between quantum systems, new “particles”, new 
bound or stationary systems, are created (Maxwell, 1972, 1976, 1982, 1988, 1994). A 
little more precisely: 
Postulate 1A: Whenever, as a result of an inelastic interaction, a system of inter-
acting “particles” creates new “particles”, bound or stationary systems, so that 
the state of the system goes into a superposition of states, each state having as-
sociated with it different particles or bound or stationary systems, then, when 
the interaction is nearly at an end, spontaneously and probabilistically, entirely 
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in the absence of measurement, the superposition collapses into one or other 
state. 
  Two examples of the kind of interactions that are involved here are the following: 
                        e- +  H 
e-  +  H    →     e- +  H*  
                         e- +  H   +  γ 
                         e-  +  e-   + p   
                        e+ +  H      
e+  +  H   →  e + +  e-  +  p        
                          (e+/e-)  +  p  
                        p +  2 γ 
(Here e-, e+, H, H*, γ, p and (e+/e-) stand for electron, positron, hydrogen atom, ex-
cited hydrogen atom, photon, proton and bound system of electron and positron, re-
spectively.) 
  What exactly does it mean to say that the “interaction is very nearly at an end” in 
the above postulate? My suggestion, here, is that it means that forces between the 
“particles” are very nearly zero, except for forces holding bound systems together. In 
order to indicate how this can be formulated precisely, consider the toy interaction: 
a  +  b  +  c   → a  +  b  +  c          (A) 
                             a  +  (bc)           (B) 
  Here, a, b and c are spinless particles, and (bc) is the bound system. Let the state of 
the entire system be Φ(t), and let the asymptotic states of the two channels (A) and 
(B) be ψA(t) and ψB(t) respectively. Asymptotic states associated with inelastic interac-
tions are fictional states towards which, according to OQT, the real state of the system 
evolves as t → + ∞. Each outcome channel has its associated asymptotic state, which 
evolves as if forces between particles are zero, except where forces hold bound sys-
tems together. 
  According to OQT, in connection with the toy interaction above, there are states 
φA(t) and φB(t) such that: 
(1)  For all t, Φ(t)  =  cAφA(t)  + cBφB(t), with |cA|2 + |cB|2  =  1; 
(2)  as t  →  + ∞,   φA(t)  →  ψA(t)  and  φB(t)  →  ψB(t).   
  The idea is that at the first instant t for which φA(t) is very nearly the same as the  
asymptotic state ψA(t), and φB(t) is very nearly the same as ψB(t), then the state of the 
system, Φ(t), collapses spontaneously either into φA(t) with probability |cA|2, or into 
φB(t) with probability |cB|2. Or, more precisely: 
Postulate 1B: At the first instant for which | 〈ψA(t)|φA(t)〉 |2  > 1 - ε or  
 Nicholas MAXWELL  330 
| 〈ψB(t)|φB(t)〉 |2  > 1 - ε, the state of the system collapses spontaneously into 
φA(t)  with probability |cA|2, or into φB(t) with probability |cB|2,  ε being a 
universal constant, a positive real number very nearly equal to zero. 
  The evolutions of the actual state of the system, Φ(t), and the asymptotic states, 
ψA(t) and ψB(t), are governed by the respective channel Hamiltonians, H, HA and HB, 
where: 
 
H  =  __  ( h2  ∇a2 +  h2  ∇b2 +   h2  ∇c2)  +  Vab + Vac + Vac  
                2ma         2mb            2mc
 
HA =   __  (   h2  ∇a2 +  h2  ∇b2 +    h2  ∇c2 )  
                  2ma           2mb            2mc
 
HB = =  __  (   h2  ∇a2 + h2  ∇b2 +   h2  ∇c2)  +  Vbc
                     2ma          2mb          2mc
 
Here, ma, mb, and mc are the masses of “particles” a, b and c respectively, and h = 
h/2π where h is Planck’s constant. 
  The condition for probabilistic collapse, formulated above, can readily be general-
ized to apply to more complicated and realistic inelastic interactions between “parti-
cles”. 
  According to the micro-realistic, fundamentally probabilistic version of quantum 
theory, indicated above, the state function, Φ(t), describes the actual physical state of 
the quantum system, from moment to moment. Quantum systems may be called 
“propensitons”. The physical (quantum) state of the propensiton evolves in accor-
dance with Schrödinger’s time-dependent equation as long as the condition for a 
probabilistic transition to occur does not obtain. The moment it does obtain, the state 
jumps instantaneously and probabilistically, in the manner indicated above, into a new 
state. (All but one of a superposition of states, each with distinct “particles” associated 
with them, vanish.) The new state then continues to evolve in accordance 
Schrödinger’s equation until conditions for a new probabilistic transition arise. 
  Propensiton quantum theory (PQT), as we may call this micro-realistic, fundamen-
tally probabilistic version of quantum theory, can recover all the experimental success 
of OQT. This follows from four points. First, OQT and PQT use the same dynamical 
equation, namely Schrödinger’s time-dependent equation. Secondly, whenever a posi-
tion measurement is made, and a quantum system is detected, this invariably involves 
the creation of a new “particle” (bound or stationary system, such as the ionisation of 
an atom or the dissociation of a molecule, usually millions of these). This means that 
whenever a position measurement is made, the conditions for probabilistic transitions 
to occur, according to PQT, are satisfied. PQT will reproduce the predictions of OQT 
(given that PQT is provided with a specification of the quantum state of the measur-
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ing apparatus). Thirdly, all other observables of OQT, such as momentum, energy, 
angular momentum or spin, always involve (i) a preparation procedure which leads to 
distinct spatial locations being associated with distinct values of the observable to be 
measured, and (ii) a position measurement in one or other spatial location. This means 
that PQT can predict the outcome of measurements of all the observables of OQT. 
Fourthly, insofar as the predictions of OQT and PQT differ, the difference is extraor-
dinarily difficult to detect, and will not be detectable in any quantum measurement so 
far performed. 
  In principle, however, OQT and PQT yield predictions that differ for experiments 
that are extraordinarily difficult to perform, and which have not yet, to my knowledge, 
been performed. Consider the following evolution: 
 
                      collision        superposition      reverse collision 
                                            a  +  b  +  c 
a  +  b  +  c   ⎯⎯⎯→                                      ⎯⎯⎯⎯→           a  +  b  +  c   
                                             a  +  (bc) 
 
         (1)             (2)                  (3)                            (4)                           (5) 
 
  Suppose the experimental arrangement is such that, if the superposition at stage (3) 
persists, then interference effects will be detected at stage (5). Suppose, now, that at 
stage (3) the condition for the superposition to collapse into one or other state, ac-
cording to PQT, obtains. In these circumstances, OQT predicts interference at stage 
(5), whereas PQT predicts no interference at stage (5), (assuming the above evolution 
is repeated many times). PQT predicts that in each individual case, at stage (3), the su-
perposition collapses probabilistically into one or other state. Hence there can be no 
interference. 
3. Further questions 
It may be asked how Φ(t) can possibly represent the real physical state of a quantum 
system given that Φ(t) is a complex function of space and time. The answer is that 
Φ(t) can always be construed to depict two real functions of space and time. 
  It may be asked how Φ(t) can possibly represent the real physical state of a quan-
tum system consisting of two (or more) quantum entangled “particles”, since in this 
case Φ(t) is a function of six dimensional configuration space plus time (or, in general, 
a function of 3N configuration space plus time, where N is the number of quantum 
entangled “particles” that go to make up the system in question). In the case of two 
“particles”, we can construe Φ(r1, r2, t), where r1 and r2 are the spatial coordinates of 
“particles” 1 and 2 respectively, as depicting the propensity state of the system in real 
3-dimensional physical space, as follows. |Φ(r1, r2, t)|2 dV1dV2 represents the prob-
ability of the system interacting in a localizing (wave-packet-collapsing) way such that 
“particle” 1 interacts in volume element dV1 about spatial coordinates r1, and “parti-
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cle” 2 interacts in volume element dV2 about spatial coordinates r2. The quantum en-
tangled nature of the system means that as r2 is changed, so the probability of “parti-
cle” 1 interacting in dV1 about r2 will, in general, change too. 
  It may be objected that postulate 1(A+B) provides no mechanism for quantum 
systems to be localized. This is not correct. If a highly localized system, S1, interacts 
inelastically with a highly unlocalized system, S2, in such a way that a probabilistic 
transition occurs, then S1 will localize S2. If an atom or nucleus emits a photon which 
travels outwards in a spherical shell and which is subsequently absorbed by a localized 
third system, the localization of the photon will localize the emitting atom or nucleus 
with which it was quantum entangled. 
  Postulate 1(A+B) above has been formulated for rearrangement collisions. But the 
postulate is intended to apply to inelastic interactions that lead to the creation (or an-
nihilation) of new particles, as in interactions such as e- + e+ → 2γ. Such interactions 
require that one employs relativistic QT, which is beyond the scope of the present pa-
per. It deserves to be noted, however, that the root idea that probabilistic transitions 
occur when new “particles” are created can be interpreted in a number of different 
ways. 
(1) There is the option considered above. The inelastic interaction must be such that 
distinct “particle” channels have, associated with them, distinct asymptotic states 
which evolve in accordance with distinct Hamiltonians. This means at least that dis-
tinct “particles” have different masses associated with them (so that an excited state of 
a bound system is, potentially, a different “particle” from the ground state, since the 
excited state will be slightly more massive than the ground state). 
(2) As above, except that, for two interaction channels to differ it is not sufficient that 
“particles” associated with the two channels have distinct masses; either there are dif-
ferent numbers of “particles” (counting a bound system as one “particle”) associated 
with different channels, or there is at least one “particle” which has a different charge, 
or force, associated with it. 
(3) For a probabilistic transition to occur, rest mass must be converted into energy of  
“particles” without rest mass (eg photons), or vice versa. 
(4) For a probabilistic transition to occur, fermions must be converted into bosons, or 
vice versa. 
  Only experiment can decide between these options. The import of this paper, and 
of previous papers published by the author (Maxwell, 1972; 1973a; 1973b; 1976; 1982; 
1988; 1993b; 1994; 1995; 1998, ch. 7) is that a major research effort ought to get un-
derway, both theoretical and experimental, devoted to exploring and testing rival col-
lapse hypotheses. Only in this way will a version of quantum theory be developed free 
of the defects of OQT which also meets with greater empirical success than OQT. 
Only in this way will physics succeed in providing some kind of answer to the two 
childishly elementary, inter-related questions with which we began. 
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4. Quantum confusions a part of a historical pattern 
I conclude with a historical remark. I have argued that the long-standing failure to 
solve the mysteries of the quantum domain —and so to develop a fully acceptable 
version of quantum theory— is due to the misguided attempt to understand the prob-
abilistic quantum domain in terms of deterministic metaphysical ideas appropriate to 
the earlier theories of classical physics. As a result of the failure to solve the wholly 
misguided traditional wave/particle problem, Heisenberg, Bohr, Born and others de-
veloped quantum theory as a theory about the results of performing measurements, 
which seemed successfully to avoid the need to specify precisely the nature of quan-
tum systems, but which unintentionally led to the creation of a theory with severe, if 
somewhat surreptitious, defects. 
  This pattern of confusion has occurred on at least two earlier occasions in the his-
tory of physics. On these occasions, too, physicists have attempted to interpret a new 
theory in terms of old, inappropriate metaphysics; the failure of this misguided effort 
then leads to despair at the possibility of interpreting the new theory realistically. It 
leads to instrumentalism, in other words, to the view that physical theories have to be 
interpreted as being about observable phenomena, and not about unobservable physi-
cal entities such as particles and fields. Eventually, however, the new theory may be in-
terpreted in terms of new appropriate metaphysics. Physicists, one might say, are bril-
liant when it comes to equations, but not so brilliant —or at least very conservative— 
when it comes to metaphysics. 
  An example is Newton’s theory of gravitation which postulates a force at a dis-
tance between bodies with mass. The reigning metaphysical idea at the time was the 
corpuscular hypothesis, the thesis that nature is made up of tiny corpuscles which in-
teract only by contact. This thesis functioned as a standard of intelligibility: no funda-
mental physical theory could claim to be intelligible if it could not be interpreted in 
terms of the corpuscular hypothesis. The impossibility of interpreting Newton’s the-
ory of gravitation in terms of the corpuscular hypothesis initially led some of New-
ton’s most eminent contemporaries to reject Newton’s theory. Thus Huygens, in a let-
ter to Leibniz, writes: “Concerning the Cause of the flux given by M. Newton, I am by 
no means satisfied [by it], nor by all the other Theories that he builds upon his Princi-
ple of Attraction, which seems to me absurd... I have often wondered how he could 
have given himself all the trouble of making such a number of investigations and dif-
ficult calculations that have no other foundation that this very principle” (Koyre, 
1965, pp. 117-8). Newton in a sense agreed, as is indicated by his remark: “That grav-
ity should be innate, inherent and essential to matter, so that one body may act upon 
another, at a distance through a vacuum, without the mediation of anything else... is to 
me so great an absurdity, that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters a 
competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it” (Burtt, 1932, pp. 265-6). The im-
possibility of interpreting the law of gravitation in terms of the corpuscular hypothe-
sis, in terms of action-by-contact, led Newton to interpret the law instrumentalistically, 
as specifying the way bodies move without providing any kind of explanation for the 
motion, in terms of unobservable forces. Subsequently, however, Boscovich and oth-
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ers were able to conceive of a metaphysical view more appropriate to Newton’s new 
theory, according to which nature is made up of point-particles, with mass, each 
point-particle being surrounded by a rigid, spherically-symmetric, centrally directed 
field of force which varies with distance. Reject the corpuscular hypothesis and adopt, 
instead, this new Boscovichean metaphysics, and Newton’s theory ceases to be in-
comprehensible, and becomes the very model of comprehensibility. 
  Another example is provided by James Clerk Maxwell’s theory of electrodynamics. 
Maxwell himself, and most of his contemporaries and immediate successors, sought to 
interpret the electromagnetic field in terms of a material substratum, the hypothetical 
aether, itself to be understood in Newtonian terms. A tremendous amount of effort 
was put into trying to understand Maxwell’s field equations in terms of the aether. Fa-
raday, who appreciated that one should take the electromagnetic field as a new kind of 
physical entity, and explain matter in terms of the field rather than try to explain the 
field in terms of a kind of hypothetical matter (the aether), was ignored. The unrealis-
tic character, and ultimate failure, of mechanical models of the electromagnetic field 
led many to hold that the real nature of the field must remain a mystery. The most 
that one could hope for from Maxwell’s equations, it seemed, was the successful pre-
diction of observable phenomena associated with electromagnetism. This instrumen-
talistic attitude remained even after the advent of Einstein’s special theory of relativity 
in 1905, which might be interpreted as giving credence to the idea that it is the field 
that is fundamental. Gradually, however, Einstein and others came to adopt the view 
that one should see the field as a new kind of physical entity, quite distinct from cor-
puscle and point-particle. 
  There are two lessons to be learned from these episodes, one for quantum theory 
specifically, the other for theoretical physics in general. In the first place, quantum 
theory, if fundamentally probabilistic, needs to be formulated as a theory about fun-
damentally probabilistic physical entities —propensitons— however weird these may 
seem given our common sense and classical intuitions. We require a fully micro-
realistic version of quantum theory which, though testable, says nothing about “ob-
servables” or “measurement” in the basic postulates of the theory at all. Secondly, if 
theoretical physics is to free itself from the obstructive tendency to interpret new 
theories in terms of old, inappropriate metaphysics, physicists need to recognize that 
metaphysical ideas are inevitably an integral part of theoretical physics, and need to be 
developed and improved in the light of new theoretical developments. Elsewhere 
(Maxwell, 1998), I have argued that, in order to construe physics as a rational enter-
prise, we need to see physics as making a hierarchy of metaphysical assumptions con-
cerning the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe, these assumptions be-
coming increasingly insubstantial, and thus increasingly likely to be true, as we ascend 
the hierarchy. According to this “aim-oriented empiricist” view, this hierarchy creates 
a framework of reasonably secure, permanent assumptions (and associated methods) 
within which much more specific and fallible assumptions (and associated methods), 
low down in the hierarchy, can be revised and improved. If ever the physics commu-
nity came to accept and put into scientific practice this aim-oriented empiricist meth-
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odology, then the best available metaphysical ideas might lead the way to the discovery 
of new physical theories, instead of obstructing interpretation and understanding of 
theories that have been discovered (and thus also obstructing the discovery of new 
theories). In one exceptional case in the history of physics, the new metaphysics came 
first, led the way, and actually made possible the subsequent discovery of the new the-
ory. This happened when Einstein discovered general relativity. Einstein first hit upon 
the metaphysical idea that gravitation is due to the curvature of space-time, and then 
subsequently discovered how to capture this idea precisely in the field equations of 
general relativity. In stark contrast to the cases of Newtonian theory, Maxwellian clas-
sical electrodynamics and quantum theory, general relativity was discovered as a result 
of the prior development of new appropriate metaphysics, instead of the discovery of 
the new theory, if anything, being obstructed by current metaphysical ideas, the theory 
being misunderstood and misinterpreted by such ideas, once discovered. That Ein-
stein’s discovery of general relativity should stand out in this way is not, in my view, 
surprising: as I have argued elsewhere (Maxwell 1993a), Einstein both put into prac-
tice, and upheld, a conception of science close to that of aim-oriented empiricism. 
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